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CHANGING POLICE CULTURE:

THE SINE QUA NON OF REFORM
Robert W. Benson*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM IS POLICE CULTURE

My background is not in American criminal justice but in international human rights law. I asked to contribute to this Symposium
because-until a few days ago with the release of the Chemerinsky
reportl -in all the calls for reform of the Los Angeles Police Department I had not heard a clear call for cultural reform--the one reform that the human rights movement teaches us is fundamental if
any others are to succeed. Human rights advocates working on
situations generically similar to those of the LAPD in Latin America,
Asia, Africa, or Europe would not limit themselves to stepped-up
prosecutions, monitoring, procedural change, and other technical
mechanisms. They would also see the task as one of changing police
culture. They would work to change it through countervailing pressure groups that champion different cultural norms and through imposing new basic police policies. Significant academic research supports this focus on cultural norms to influence behavior.2 Without
reform of police culture, we could end up with merely a Potemkin
Village of legal reforms in which everything stays the same behind
the scenes.

* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. This Article was prepared for
delivery at the Rampart Scandal Symposium at Loyola Law School, Los An-

geles on September 14 and 15, 2000.

1. See Envin Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles

Police Department's Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34
LoY. L.A. L. REv. 545 (2001). The report makes some of the same points
made here.
2. See Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and CriminalJustice,52
STAN. L. REv. 777, 803 n.88 (2000).
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The full job of analyzing police culture in Los Angeles would
require a good deal more time and space than is allotted to me here.
It would start with the history of policing in the United States and
end with the particular history of the LAPD. For today, I will just
jump ahead of the story to identify four current sources of cultural
values within the LAPD that seem to be driving many of the human
rights abuses and illegal acts that have erupted in the Rampart scandal, in the department's behavior during the recent Democratic National Convention, and in other incidents. Those sources are as follows: (1) machismo; (2) militarism; (3) racism; and (4) the code of
silence.
I will discuss only the first two. The third, racism, is an oftentold story. Both the McCone Commission, reporting after the 1965
Los Angeles riots, and the Christopher Commission, reporting in
1991 after the Rodney King incident, officially urged the kind of
cultural change within the LAPD that I am urging here, primarily
through recruitment of more minority officers. We can say that,
while some steps have been taken in the right direction, the goal of
ridding the LAPD of a culture of racism continues tragically to elude
us. The fourth source, the code of silence, is discussed in the new
Chemerinsky report.
II. MACHISMO

Machismo, or what some have called hypermasculinity, 4 is the
value system that celebrates male physical strength, aggression, violence, competition, and dominance. It denigrates the lack of these
qualities as weak, female behavior. Professor Angela Harris notes in
a recent article in the Stanford Law Review that "[p]olice work has
traditionally been coded hypermasculine" by the general culture.5
"The experience of street policing," she writes,
is deeply steeped in a masculine culture of brotherhood that
rests on the division between "us" and "them." Although
"us" is supposed to refer to honest citizens and "them" to

3. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1 at 573-75.
4. See Harris, supra note 2, at 794-99.
5. Id. at 793.
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lawbreakers, often "us" becomes simply a mirror image of
"them': our guys against their guys.
•.. And, like the gangs they are dedicated to eradicating,

law enforcement officers share a commitment to masculine
ideals, moving within a culture of honor in which respect
must be paid or violence will follow.
... The hypermasculinity of policing leads to a culture in
which violence is always just below the surface. 6
The practical results of this police machismo are that male officers get themselves involved in hostile confrontations with the public, use of excessive force, shootings, drug dealing, and apparently,
as we see now in the Rampart scandal, framing of suspects through
deceit and lies. The silver lining in this cloud is that female officers
are rarely involved in such misconduct, precisely because they rarely
share the value system of machismo.
In 1991 testimony to the Christopher Commission, Katherine
Spillar, national coordinator of the Feminist Majority Foundation,
analyzed academic research on the differences between men and
women in policing. 7 Spillar noted that the research shows that female police officers are as effective in dangerous situations, but are
6. Id. at 794-96.
7. See Katherine Spillar, Testimony Before the Independent Commission
on the Los Angeles Police Department (May 13, 1991), in WOMEN'S
ADVISORY COUNCIL To THE L.A. POLICE COMM'N, A BLUEPRINT FOR
IMPLEMENTING GENDER EQUITY IN THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

app.

G (1993). Spillar refers primarily to CLAREMONT GRADUATE SCH., THE

IMPACT OF FANCHON BLAKE v CITY OF Los ANGELES (1990); PATRICIA V.
LUNNENBORG, WOMEN POLICE OFFICERS-CURRENT CAREER PROFILES

(1989); Joseph Balkin, WPhy Policemen Don'tLike Policewomen, 16 J. POLICE
ScI. & ADMIN. 29 (1988); Sean A. Grennan, Findings on the Role of Officer
Gender in Violent Encounters with Citi-ens, 15 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 78

(1987); Robert J. Homant & Daniel B. Kennedy, Police Perceptions of Spouse
Abuse: A Comparison of Male and Female Officers, 13 J. CRIM. JUST. 29
(1985); Daniel Saunders & Patricia Size, Attitudes About Woman Abuse
Among Police Officers, Victims and Victim Advocates, 1 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 25 (1986); Lewis J. Sherman, A Psychological View of Women in
Policing, 1 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 383 (1973); Carol Ann Martin, Women
Police and Stress, POLICE CHIEF, Mar. 1983, at 107.
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less authoritarian, less aggressive, involved in fewer shootings, receive fewer complaints, more effective at diffusing potentially vioand have better communication skills than male offilent situations,
8
cers.
The Christopher Commission's report found that Spillar's points
held true in Los Angeles:
Virtually every indicator examined by the Commission
establishes that female LAPD officers are involved in excessive use of force at rates substantially below those of
male officers. There were no female officers among the
120 officers with the most use of force reports. Female officers accounted for 3.4% of the officers involved in or at
the scene of incidents underlying the 83 most serious lawsuits against the LAPD resolved from 1986 through 1990.
A study also was conducted by the Commission of the top
10% of the LAPD officers ranked by the combined use of
force reports, personnel complaints and officer-involved
shootings. There were no female officers among the top
132 officers. Only 3.7% (30) of the 808 LAPD officers
with the highest number of incidents were women officers.
The statistics indicate that female officers are not reluctant to use force, but they are not nearly as likely to be involved in the use of excessive force. The statistics are
borne out by the weight of academic and anecdotal evidence gathered by the Commission. With some exceptions,
female officers interviewed believed they were more communicative, more skillful at deescalating potentially violent
situations and less confrontational. A suspect's defiance
and disrespect of an officer often gives rise to use of force
by an officer. Many officers, both male and female, believe
female officers are less personally challenged by defiant
suspects and feel less need to deal with defiance with immediate force or confrontational language. 9
8. See Spillar, supra note 7.
9. INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

(1991).

83-84
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We may extend the Christopher Commission's findings by
looking at the news reports of officers accused in the Rampart scandal So far as I can discover, while some 18.5% of LAPD officers
are currently women,' 0 only one woman's name appears to be among
the approximately seventy officers currently implicated in the Rampart scandal.
The week of this Symposium, the Feminist Majority Foundation
and National Center for Women & Policing took these findings into
a new dimension by putting dollar figures on the civil suits against
the City caused by male and female LAPD officers' misconduct. In
a detailed analysis of the eighty judgments or settlements between
1990 and 1999 exceeding $100,000 that involved excessive force,
sexual assault, or domestic violence by police, the Foundation and
the Center calculated that payouts on cases involving male officers
exceeded payouts on cases involving female officers by a ratio of
twenty-three to one, although the overall ratio of male to female police officers and sergeants serving on patrol was only four to one.
The numbers of male officers involved in or at the scene of an excessive force incident exceeded the numbers of female officers by a ratio of more than nine to one. Of the total $66.3 million paid during
these years, male officers accounted for $63.4 million, or 95.8% of it.
The portion of this due to sexual assault, sexual abuse, molestation,
and domestic violence was $10.4 million, all attributable to male officers."
Instead of acting upon the extensive evidence of differences
between men and women police-and recruiting and promoting
more women-police departments nationwide are bastions of what
Spillar describes as "open sex discrimination and
sexual harassment"
2
and negative attitudes toward female officers.'

10. See NAT'L CTIL FOR WOMEN & POLICING: PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN ON
THE LAPD: 1995-2000 (2000) (on file with Penny Harrington, Director, Na-

tional Center For Women & Policing).
11. See FEMINIST MAJORITY FoUND. & NAT'L CTR. FOR WOMEN &
POLICING, GENDER DIFFERENCES IN THE COST OF POLICE BRUTALITY AND

MISCONDUCT: A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF LAPD CIvIL LIABILITY CASES:

1990-1999 (2000), available at http'J/v.feminist.org/police/Excessive
Force.htinl.
12. See Spillar, supra note 7, at 16-17.
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The Christopher Commission found this was so in the LAPD,
citing egregious examples.' 3 Later, evidence about detective Mark
Fuhrman during the O.J. Simpson trial revealed a secret society
within the LAPD called "Men Against Women" designed to discourage women officers.1 4 Then, research found that a large percentage
of male police officers commit acts of domestic violence in their own
homes." 5 In Los Angeles, the Board of Police Commissioners' Inspector General found that job performance evaluations failed even
to mention the issue in seventy-five percent of the cases where domestic violence charges had been sustained against officers.' 6 Is it
any wonder, then, that informant and former officer Rafael Perez told
investigators in the Rampart Scandal that female officers generally
be
could not be trusted enough to "be in the loop" of illegality? To
' 17
in the loop, officers had to be what Perez called "stand up guys."
As day follows night, it follows that we need fewer "stand up
guys" in the LAPD and many more women. This will ultimately dissolve the culture of machismo. How is this to be achieved? The
LAPD has consistently missed its target under the Blake Consent
Decree from the 1980s to increase hiring of women to twenty percent
of each entering class, though it has made slow progress. The department has also failed to meet the directives of the Los Angeles
City Council to implement the Christopher Commission reforms by
gender-balancing each entering class up to the number of women in
the general work force, which today is about fifty percent. The Department is subverting the recruitment effort primarily by relying on
inappropriate standards of physical strength, which have not been
shown to be related to police effectiveness or success in dangerous
situations.' 8 The three nongovernmental interest groups in Los
13. See INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, supra note 9, at 84-88.
14. See Jim Newton & Henry Weinstein, Simpson Lawyers Attack Key Detective's Credibility,L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1994, at Al.
15. See NAT'L CTR. FOR WOMEN & POLICING, EQUALITY DENIED: THE
STATUS OF WOMEN IN POLICING: 1999, at 5 (2000).
16. See Memorandum from the Feminist Majority Foundation et al., to the
Members of the Los Angeles City Council et al. 3 (May 18, 2000) (on file with
author).
17. Scott Glover & Matt Lait, Police in Secret Group Broke Law Routinely,
TranscriptsSay, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2000, at Al.
18. See NAT'L CTR. FOR WOMEN & POLICING, HIRING AND RETAINING
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Angeles pressuring LAPD on this issue-the Feminist Majority
Foundation, the National Center for Women & Policing, and the
California Women's Law Center---urge that the consent decree now
being negotiated between the City and the U.S. Justice Department
over Rampart include mandatory gender balance among new recruits
and prohibition of inappropriate physical fitness tests. It is difficult
to disagree with their conclusion that "gender balancing the department is the single most significant reform that could be implemented
in the consent decree."' 19
I. MILITARISM
Police departments have always been organized as military-style
hierarchies, but in recent decades they have gone beyond organization to mimic military tactics in the streets. This means, among other
things, a maximum use of force even in minor situations, use of
heavy, sophisticated gear and equipment, a threatening and hostile
demeanor toward the public, and a siege mentality in which the police dehumanize the citizens into enemies in a war which must be
won at all costs. It is no coincidence that this militarization started
after the black urban uprisings in the 1960s. A year after the 1965
Watts Riots, the LAPD invented the nation's first SWAT team. The
national War on Crime followed and then the War on Drugs. In
1981, Congress broke the traditional separation of military and civilian law enforcement established by the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act
when it adopted a drug exception in the Military Cooperation with
Law Enforcement Officials Act. In 1987, Congress established an
agency with an 800 number to encourage police departments to apply
for military hardware, and in 1994 the Departments of Defense and
Justice signed a memorandum of understanding that enables the
military to transfer wartime technology to local police. 20 The LAPD
WoMEN: A SELF-ASSESSMENT GUIDE FOR LAWi ENFORCEMENT.

19. Memorandum from the Feminist Majority Foundation et al., supra note
16, at 4. The authors of that memorandum also recommend that the consent
decree establish oversight of investigations of officers accused of domestic
violence and categorize complaints of domestic violence as "at risk conduct"
triggering a "problem officer" tracking system. See id.
20. See Diana Cecilia Weber, 'We Have Met tie Enemy': Militarizationof
the PoliceEndangers Our Liberty and Safety, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 18, 1999, at
90.
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launchers, 112 armored personnel carriers, and
received 73 grenade
2'
600 M-16 rifles.
Thus, law enforcement in Los Angeles came to look a little like
Vietnam, a little like Fujimori's Peru. Even before the Rampart
Scandal, many outrageous incidents of military-style action were
well documented in print by expert police-abuse attorneys such as
Paul Hoffman, Carol Watson, and others.22 Bringing the picture up
to the moment, one need only ask civil liberties attorney Carol Sobel
or Professor Karl Manheim of Loyola Law School to describe the serious injuries they and others sustained at the hands of the LAPD in
August of this year as they stood as legal observers of an unprovoked
military-style sweep of citizens a few blocks from the Loyola Law
School campus during the Democratic National Convention.
The antidote to the military model of policing is said to be the
"community policing" model. The Christopher Commission specifically recommended that community policing replace the aggressive
style of the LAPD. The recommendation was implemented by the
City Council, the Police Commission, and the last police chief.
Now, Chief Bernard Parks is accused of dismantling it.2 3 In the
words of political science Professor Steve Erie of the University of
policing but
California at San Diego, "Los Angeles tried community
' 24
approach.
army
invading
the
to
back
went
then
Important as it may be to take community policing seriously,
other policy changes will also be needed to reverse the culture of
militarism. Acquisition of military equipment should be questioned,
and recruitment of officers at military bases should be halted. Most
important of all, the entire criminal justice system in Los Angeles
21. See id.
22. See, e.g., Carol Watson, Testimony Before the Los Angeles Citizens'
Commission on U.S. Drug Policy, in INST. FOR POLICY STUDIEs, THE WAR ON
DRUGS: ADDICTED TO FAILURE: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE Los ANGELES
CITIZENs' COMMISSION ON U.S. DRUG POLICY 39 (Robert W. Benson et al.
eds., 2000); Paul Hoffiman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an
Effective FederalRole in ControllingPolice Abuse in Urban America, 66 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1455 (1993).
23. See Annette Kondo, LAPD Community Advisors Angered by Changes
to Boards,L.A. TIMES, June 12, 2000, at B3.
24. Tony Perry, Less-Traveled Path Leads to Success for San Diego Police,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2000, atA3.
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should declare that it is dropping out of the federal government's
War on Drugs. The drug war is an irrational fiasco that needs to be
replaced with drug treatment and education programs.25 Among the
many devastating costs of the drug war is the further militarization
and the corruption of police on a wide scale. Former San Jose and
Kansas City Police Chief Joseph MeNamara, now a fellow at the
Hoover Institution, talks of these effects with brutal frankness:
Quite often in drug war corruption, the police were the
gangsters-on duty committing armed robberies, at times
murder, stealing drugs, selling drugs, framing people, and
committing predatory crimes. Now, this was not an aberration limited to one city. This was something that occurred
all across America ....
I have researched this for six years, and I'm sorry to say
that I have documented thousands of instances where police
officers have done this kind of thing....
...[Even] the otherwise honest cops that would never
commit a robbery or steal anything often feel perfectly justified in conducting unconstitutional searches and perjuring
their testimony to get the evidence into court.
The reason this goes on is because the police officers
have been told by their superiors, the elected officials, that
they're in a holy war, and that this is good against evil. The
cops that got caught said, "What else could we do? We had
to have a kind of street justice. The end justifies the
means."
So we have created a kind of culture within American police departments with the war on drugs that has produced
not only gangster cops in thousands of cases across
25. See generally Watson, supra note 22, at 41-42 (discussing the "cor-

rupting... zeal underlying the paramilitary approach to the social and medical

issue of drugs").
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America, but we have also corrupted the rank and file cops.
They have forgotten what their mission is. They are not
soldiers in a war, they're peace officers with a fundamental
duty to protect human life.2 6
IV. CONCLUSION

How, then, can the LAPD's culture of machismo and militarism
be transformed? It will be vital to keep up all the usual pressures:
civil suits for damages, oversight by the U.S. Justice Department,
political accountability to the City Council, procedural and structural
reforms within the department, and audits and mechanisms for individual accountability, not only within the LAPD but also in the
prosecutors' offices and in the courts. But I would not expect these
alone to accomplish the goal. If I were looking for the points of
maximum leverage to change the system over the long term, I would
look to the pressure groups that champion different cultural values,
those that advocate specifically for women in the police department,
community policing, and an end to the drug war. The extent to
which groups like these are able to garner public and political support in the general culture will determine whether police culture will
change and stay changed. Their struggle will not be easy or unopposed-recall that after the militaristic performance of the LAPD at
August's Democratic National Convention, the Mayor, the police
commission, the major newspaper, and the downtown merchants association all congratulated the cops, in effect, for shooting rubber
bullets at hundreds of innocent citizens and wrongfully arresting
many others.

26. Joseph McNamara, Testimony to the Los Angeles Citizens' Comniission on U.S. Drug Policy, in INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES, supra note 22, at 3235.

